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lN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

DELBERT CHRIS CLARK

:

Petfttoner-Appe11ant,

••

va.

:

JOHN w. TURNER, warden
Utah State Prtson,
Reapondent.

Case No.
10684

'
i

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE Of CASE
This js an appeal from a dental of a
petition for writ of error, construed by
the local court aa a wrtt of Habeas Corpus.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A hearing waa held before the Honorable Marce11ua K. Snow, Judge, Salt Lake
County, Utah, on June 22, 1966.

The court

2

treated the petitioner's Writ of Error
as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and denied the same.
RELIEF

~OUGHT

ON APPEAL

The appe11•nt seeks reversal of the
judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant filed a petition for
writ of Error alleging that on June 2,
1961 he was convicted of second degree
burglary and of the status of betng •
habitual crtmtnal.

The sentencing court

sentenced the appellant uder the second
degree burglary

1t1t~t•

and t•posed •

separate sentence under the habitual
criminal statute which provides for a

3

term of not Jess than fifteen years.
The appe11ant c1atms a vfo1ation of
tho Oue Process and double Jeopardy.
No evidence was presented et the

hearing.

However, ft was agreed thlt

the petitioner wes sentenced to two

separate sentences, one for second
dewree burglary and habttua1 crtmtna1.

(R-4) (R-8).
conm~ted

These sentences were 1ater

to run concurrently.
ARGUMENT #1

THi S£HTENC1NG COURT YIOLATEO TH[
DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS SECURED UNDER THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT IN IMPOSING TWO SEPARATE
SENTENCES ON TH! PETITIONER FOR TH! THIRD
SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE AND H49ITUAL CRIMINAL
.iTATUS.

lt ts respectfully aubmttted that the

4

sentencing COJrt violated the petittoner•1
right secured under the double jeopardy

clause of the ftfth Amendment, Untied
States Constf tutton and Utah Constitution,
Art. 1 sec:. 12, which prQhlblta any person
from being twice put f n jeopardy for the

same offense.
The habf tua1 criminal statute ta
set forth In UCA 76-1-18 as amended (1953)
and 76-1-19 as amended (1953)

~

clearl1

1et1 forth the procedure whereby one ts

charged, tried, and sentenced •• having

the status of a habitual criminal.

The

conduct of the trial on the third aub·

stentive offense and on the Issue of
being a habitual crtmtnal 1tatu1 ts cl .. rly
set forth tn State vs. Stewart, 110 Utah

203, 171 p2d 383 (1946) •nd State va.
Leimer, JO Utah 2d 4S, J47 P2d 1111,

7~

5

ALR2d 84 {1960).

The statute ia, however,

silent as to the precise 1118nnor in which
the defendant show1d be sentenced, consequent1 y we must look to motive and purpose of the habitual criminal law for

en 1i ghtment •

It is clear that the habitual crtminal statute doea not Invoke a separate
crime but rather a 1tatu1, to wit the
1tatua of being a habitual criminal crtm-

inal.
AL~

See 58 ALR 102, 82 ALR l]j, 116

236.

Leitner va. Turner, 14 Utah 2d

232, Jtil P2d 721 {)96)).

State VI. Wood

2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P2d 99ij (ljS4).

The

habitual criminal statute doea not inflict

additional or further punishment for the

prior conviction or impoee a new punish·
ment therefor.

It only aerves to tnvoke

a more severe punish.inent for the last of

subsequent of tense which might

be

imposed

6
because of the previous c:onv ic t

24B CJS sec 1953.

tons.

Based upon thf s pro-

position the habitual criminal stetute
f n other states has been

sustained as

against the attack for vfolattng the
double jeopardy concept.

Sec. 58 ALR

23, 82 ALR 348, 116 ALR 212.
A typical statement by the courts
ts found in Ke11ey va. State (1933) 204
Ind. 512, 185 NE 453 wherein the court
said:

The statute does not tmpose an
•ddittonel penalty on crtme1 for
~1ch the defendant has alreedy
11

been convicted. lt simply tmposes a heavter penalty for the
conrnf aston of a felonv. The
punishment is for the ne~ crhna
"9n1y. 0
~ince there is no separate erim of

being a habitual c;fmtna1, there can be

no separate sentence under the habtt._.1
crtmfnal law.

The lower court, tn the

7
instant case, sentenced the defendant
on two separate offenses, t.e., on the
second degree

b~rgl•ry

habitual crtmfnaJ law.

statute end on the
Consequently,

the lower court f ~nored the nature and
purpose of the habitual st•tute and, fn

fact, did not enhance the puntshment of
the thf rd aubstantfve offense, but rather

inf Jicted punishment twfce for the same
·offense.

By sentencing the defendant

on two separate c::harges, to

~un

eonsec-

ut i vel y, the defendant was befng punfshed

not only for the burglary charge, but
also for befng a habitual crtmfnel, which

included as a Clondttfon, the ftndfng
g._,11ty on the

tt~frd

offense charge.

subst•ntfve burglary

~son

vs. Harrf 1, 106

Utah 32, 144 P2d 761 (1944).

The end

result of the lower court•s sentencfng

procedure would be that the defendant
would be forced to serve the aentence
on the burglary cherge and after the
termination or conl'nutatton of thet

charge, he would serve the naw sentence
under the habitual criminal charge.
It seems evident that the 1C*er

C0'8't

considered thet two aeperate offenaes
had been conmitted when tt not only
inf Hcted two separate sentences, but

ruled that the aentence1 were 'o nm
consecuttvely (K•3).

Moreover, it -.ould

appear that the lower

co~rt

UCA 76-1-33 as amended

had in mind

(195~)

which prQ-

vides for consecutfve sentences where
a peraon has been convtc:ted of two or

more crimes and sentences had been pronounced on one at the lower court sentenced
the defendant in the inat•nce case.

vs. $everson

u

McCoy

, 222 P2d

i 056 ( l J!JJ).

In so tX> i ng, the tri a 1 court

violated the double jeopardy clause of the
state and federal constitutions.

The

sonstitutional provision is broad enough to

mean that no one can lawfully be punished
twice for the same offense and is designed
to protect the accused from double punish-

ment as m"'ch as to protect him from two
trials.
a

c~rsory

248 CJS sec. 1990 (a).

Moreover,

examination of the Utah cases

indicate that the proper proc;edure ta
i 111pos i ti on of one sentence.

vs. Harrts, 107 Utah
reh~ring

( 1J4Lt).

~9.

See Thompson

152 P2d 91, (1943).

denied 106 Utah 32, 144 P2d 761,
State vs. wood, Supra

In the alternative, ft is respectfully
s~bmitted

that the sentence on the habttuel

chc3r~e i5 votd

•nd without effect.

case or: Ex parte Walt

73

:.i.D.

In the

4J6, 44 N.w.

10

2d 119, ( 1950) the lower court sentenced
the defendant on the count one for ;rand

larceny, count two for burglary end upon
the tnformation charging ht• es bed.ng a

hebltual crimtnal to 11fe fmprfacnnent.

The eppeel court held that the lC*W court
had exhausted hts power and jurfadtctton
to pass any further sentence en the d9fend-

ant by stating that the lowr

COLlt had

attempted to pass a third sentence upon
the pattttoner. not to •ugment the punt1h-

ment for the crime. of betnQ "a

criminal...

hebtt~I

There being no such cirtme, the

court held that the sentence att.-pted to
be passed upon wa5 beyond the jurtsdtctton

ot' the trial court and void.

To the • -

at feet, Gameron v1. Jonea 148 ,.eb

6~5

N.w. 2d 403, ( 1JL+7) where the separate

28

11

sentence was rw1ed void.

Generally. the majorfty rule tn such
cases states that on a convfctton under
an indictment alleging prior cxanv1ct1ons
there c:an be btJt one ji,,dgment or sentence
imposed.

sec. 248 CJS sec 1'71 (a). An

illustration case ta found fn State vs.
Kins, 140 P2d 283, 18 wash 2d (194)), wherein teh Washington court auamartzed the
Washington cases with regard to sentenctng
as fol lows:

urhe c:a1e then ho 1d ( 1) that t f,
contrary to the prescrtbed procedure, sentence ts 1mpoaedf6'r
st.1bs tant ive offense whf ch thi

habttual criminal proeeedtng 11
stf 11 pending and undetermfned,
the judgment tmpostng such sentence is premature and beyond the
power or t he ~our t to enter; and
hirther, ( 2) that ff the sentence
is imposed solely upon the habitual
charge, such sentence also is vo1d.
and the defendant shoudl then be
resenteneed as for the first ttme,

12

upon the latest substantive
offense, taken f n connection
with the habitual <:rimtnal
adj udtcat ton; but ( 3) thl t ff
found sentence be once imposed
upon the defendant for the substantive offense prior to the
1nstf tutton of a habf tue1 crtmina 1 procedure, audl defendant
is subsequent1y adjudged to be
a habitual crtminel, he cannot
thereafter be agatn sentenced
for the original aubstanttve
crtme taken 1n correction wf ht
tho 1ub1equent adjudication of
his habitual crimlnal status."

This same court stated that the
correct procedure would be to after the
adj udicatfon of the habitual ertmfnal

matter to sentence the defendant for the
COll'Dfasfon of the substantive crime, wf th
the increase penalty exacted because of
the adjudication of the defendant'• habttual criminal status.

The appellant respectfu11y submttl
that the action of the 1ow.r court tn

13

imposing separate sentences on tM thtrd
substantive offense end on the haabttual
matter to run concurrently, if permitted
to stand, vtolates the double Jeopardy

provtstons of the state and Federal
constttutton.

In the a1tern11ttve, the

appellant suggests that tha sentence on
the substantive chars• i1 va1fd and tt.

other sentence ts void, consequently, the
appellant'•
the

req~at

that the sentence on

habf tua1 criminal charge be v.ated

as being void or that tho e411e be remanded

for proper sentencing tn 1fght of the P'-'•
pose of the hatbtu.1 criminal atatut:• and
in conformity tQ the poattion a.1rged by the

appe11ant.

Respectfully 1ut.ettted,

Jtmt Htt1una9e
Legal Defender

Attorney f • .,._11ant

